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Abstract
A meta-analysis was conducted to examine the extent of continued influence of misinformation
in the face of correction and the theoretical explanations of this phenomenon. Aggregation of
results from 32 studies (N= 6,527) revealed that, on average, correction does not entirely
eliminate the effect of misinformation (r = -.05, p = .045). Corrective messages were found to be
more successful when they are coherent, consistent with the audience’s world-view, and
delivered by the source of the misinformation itself. Corrections are less effective if the
misinformation was attributed to a credible source, the misinformation has been repeated
multiple times prior to correction, or when there was a time lag between the delivery of the
misinformation and the correction. These findings are consistent with predictions based on
theories of mental models and offer concrete recommendations for practitioners.
Keywords: Misinformation; correction; continued influence; meta-analysis
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A Meta-Analytic Examination of The Continued Influence of Misinformation in the Face of
Correction: How Powerful is it, why does it Happen, and how to Stop it?
In the contemporary media environment individuals often encounter myths, rumors,
reporting errors, and misinformation deliberately or inadvertently circulated by the media,
governments, and other interest groups. Recent research shows that on social media, false news
reach more people and spread more rapidly than accurate news (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).
For example, during the 2016 presidential elections, nearly one in four Americans was exposed
to a false news story but fact-checking stories reached only a narrow set of media consumers
(Guess, Nyhan & Reifler, 2018). This spread of misinformation poses a challenge to traditional
news. For instance, the CNN Tonight anchor, Don Lemon, expressed his frustration, saying on
the air: “I spend most of my time trying to debunk falsities and lies” (Lemon, April 2018).
Although massive efforts are devoted to debunking rumors, correcting of misinformation,
and fact-checking, scientific evidence of the effectiveness of these measures appears to be
inconsistent (Walter & Murphy, 2018). While some studies have found corrective information to
reduce the effect of falsehoods (e.g., Skurnik, Yoon, & Schwarz, 2005) other studies suggest that
individuals may struggle to discount misinformation (e.g., Schwarz et al., 2007). In fact,
corrective messages can even backfire by increasing support for the discredited position (Nyhan
& Reifler, 2010). Multiple theoretical frameworks have been developed in an attempt to account
for the complexities of such continued effect of misinformation (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert,
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). However, individual studies that examine those theoretical
propositions are typically designed to test a single explanatory mechanism at a time, whereas in
reality, multiple psychological processes are likely to operate simultaneously. Moreover, when
examined in isolation, individual studies do not permit valid generalizations, as each individual
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study is limited to a particular set of messages, samples, and measurements (O’Keefe, 2015).
The present study employs a meta-analytical approach to advance the understanding of
the scope and mechanisms underlying the continued influence of misinformation in the face of
correction by aggregating results across multiple studies. Once the overall effect size is
determined, a series of moderation analyses test a number of previously proposed explanations to
the continued effect of misinformation. Specifically, the study investigates: (a) characteristics of
misinformation that make the misinformation harder to root out and (b) characteristics that make
certain forms of correction more or less effective. By systematically exploring the properties of
the misinformation and the characteristics of corrective information, the current study advances
the theoretical understanding of the psychology of managing conflicting information and offers
practical guidelines for designing more effective correction messages.
The Continued Influence of Misinformation
The continued influence of misinformation can be thought of as one of many information
processing biases commonly exhibited by media consumers. For instance, it is well documented
that individuals privilege exemplar-based information over base-rate information, such that
individuals’ perceptions of an issue can be skewed by unrepresentative exemplars (Allen, Preiss,
& Gayle, 2006; Zillmann, 2002). Importantly, whereas the exemplification theory is concerned
with how individuals manage different types of information (statistics vs. exemplars) that are
both correct, the current study explores responses to correction or retraction of the same type of
information such that the status of the initial communication changes from true to false.
Past meta-analyses examining the effect of correction compared to uncorrected
misinformation control conditions have found that corrective messages can, indeed, significantly
reduce belief in misinformation (Blank & Launay, 2014; Walter & Murphy, 2018). These
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findings importantly demonstrate that exposure to a correction is better than receiving no
correction at all. However, this choice of control largely overlooks the role played by
misinformation. Recently, Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson and Albarracín (2017) aggregated the
results of eight reports to reveal a large effect (d = .75-1.06) of misinformation in the face of
correction. However, given the limited scope of the study (eight reports published from 1994 to
2015 and three moderators) and its exploratory nature, there is a need for a more complete and
theory-driven synthesis of the literature.
To further advance this field, the current meta-analysis specifically examines randomized
experiments comparing between attitudes and beliefs of individuals who were exposed to
corrected misinformation and those who were not exposed to misinformation in the first place.
This contrast allows to determine the extent to which correction interventions revert the
individuals’ attitudes and beliefs back to baseline (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Fenton, & Martin,
2014). Given that participants are randomly assigned to conditions, they are expected to be
equivalent in terms of their baseline attitudes and other characteristics. Ideally, if corrective
messages were fully effective, there would be no significant difference between the beliefs of
those exposed to the correction following a false message compared to those who were never
exposed to the misinformation in the first place. Thus, significant differences between these two
conditions represent the continued effect of misinformation in spite of the correction. The first
aim of the present study is to identify the average continued effect of misinformation:
RQ1: What is the effect of correction of misinformation compared to a nomisinformation control?
Once the average effect size of the continued misinformation influence is identified,
theoretical mechanisms underlying this effect are explored.
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Theoretical Explanations of the Continued Influence of Misinformation
Multiple theories explicate the effect of misinformation in spite of correction. These are
by no means competing theories. Rather they complement each other and at times may overlap.
Mental models. According to this approach, individuals construct a mental
representation of unfolding events but seem reluctant to dismiss key information if an alternative
explanation was sufficient to fill this void (Ecker, Lewandowky, Swire, & Chang, 2011). In
other words, individuals may prefer to uphold a coherent, albeit incorrect mental model than to
be left with an incomplete one (Johnson & Seifert, 1994).
Hence, to be effective, a correction should offer information that can successfully replace
the refuted components of the mental model without compromising the coherence of all the
existing elements in the story (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Rather than merely discounting the
misinformation, a successful correction should provide an alternative explanation, offering
evidence, and/or explaining why the misinformation was presented in the first place. For
instance, in the context of vaccine safety, if people think that health organizations take part in an
elaborate conspiracy to conceal relevant information from concerned parents, a message from
health experts negating the vaccination-autism link will do little to reduce belief in
misinformation. In fact, such efforts may backfire by making the audiences cling even harder to
anti-vaccination myths. A more effective correction would try to substitute the original mental
model with a coherent explanation that includes information about vaccine safety as well as
explain the corrupt history of the anti-vaccine movement. In sum, the richness of detail in the
original misinformation and the extent to which the correction offers a coherent explanatory
framework should determine the continued influence effect (Cappella, Maloney, Ophir, &
Brennan, 2015). It is hypothesized that:
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H1a: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger for high compared
to low-coherence misinformation.
H1b: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger for low compared to
high-coherence correction.
H1c: Misinformation and correction coherence will interact such that the continued
influence effect will be stronger when misinformation coherence is high but
correction coherence is low.
Once a mental model is constructed, it has been speculated that the longer the
misinformation is held the more it becomes integrated into memory and is then more difficult to
root out (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Cheung, & Maybery, 2015). Ostensibly, although even
immediately retracted information can have a trace effect, real-time corrections are easier to
integrate into the mental model, potentially minimizing the effect of misinformation. Indeed,
educational research consistently finds that immediate correction of an error is superior to a
delayed correction (Barbetta, et al., 1994). Thus, the duration of time between exposure to the
misinformation and the correction could also moderate the effect of misinformation:
H2: The longer is the time delay between exposure to misinformation and its
correction, the stronger is the continued influence of misinformation.
Fluency and familiarity. Familiarity and fluency serve as important heuristics in
favoring certain information (Berinsky, 2015). Fluency refers to the metacognitive experience of
the relative ease or difficulty of the thought process. Information can be fluent (i.e., highly
accessible), or it can be disfluent – hard to understand and retrieved only through an effortful
process (Schwarz, 2015). Overall, the literature suggests that the metacognitive experience of
fluency guides truth judgments, such that fluent information is regarded as more truthful (Reber
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& Schwarz, 1999).
In addition to the previously-discussed coherence, several factors can contribute to the
sense of fluency, including visual elements (making statements appear easy or difficult to read)
and the repetition of information. Repetition strengthens the experience of fluency and makes
information more readily accessible for retrieval, more familiar, and more consequential in
subsequent attitude formation (e.g., Hansen & Wänke, 2009). Along with fluency, numerous
judgment biases such as pluralistic ignorance (Lewandowsky et al., 2012) and perceived social
consensus (Festinger, 1954) can potentially explain the ability of repetition to solidify belief in
misinformation. As demonstrated in the context of eyewitness research, repetition, but not
number of sources, increase susceptibility to misinformation (Foster, Huthwaite, Yesberg, Garry,
& Loftus, 2012). Remarkably, Berinsky (2015) argues that simply asking subjects to repeat a
rumor to themselves – without any indication that the rumor is true - increases its effect that
persist for weeks after the initial exposure. Thus, repetition of the misinformation is likely to
make it take root further in the message recipients’ minds. In fact, the correction itself can
backfire by repeating misinformation. Since familiarity serves as a heuristic, corrective messages
that repeat the misinformation attempting to quash inaccuracies through direct refutation can
inadvertently facilitate misinformation fluency and make it even more impactful (Berinsky,
2015).
Following the same logic, it is suggested that repetition of the corrective message can
strengthen its encoding, resulting in perceived familiarity and greater acceptance of the
correction. Though only a limited number of studies systematically manipulated repetition of
corrective information, there is some evidence that repeating a correction can reduce reliance on
misinformation (Ecker, et al., 2011; Ozturk, Li, & Sakamoto, 2015). It is hypothesized that:
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H3a: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger when
misinformation is repeated.
H3b: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger when corrective
messages repeat the misinformation compared to corrective messages that do not
repeat the misinformation.
H3c: The continued influence of misinformation will be weaker when corrective
information is repeated.
Worldview consistency. To reconcile preexisting beliefs with a seemingly contradicting
reality, people are motivated to discount information that challenges their worldview by
derogating the source of the message or questioning the accuracy of the claims (Kunda, 1990).
In contrast, information that fits within people’s belief system is often judged as probative and
accepted at face value even when its validity is called into question by experts and authority
figures. Motivated processing of information can result from: (a) an attitude congruency bias or
(b) a disconfirmation bias. While the former bias focuses on scenarios where people provide
more favorable evaluations of messages that support their prior beliefs, the latter deals with
situations where disconfirming arguments are scrutinized and called into question, irrespective of
their actual merit (Taber & Lodge, 2006). In short, both biases suggest that when motivated to
reach a certain conclusion, people can vary their level of attention and scrutiny of information to
support their preferences (Chang, 2015).
Unsurprisingly, when information that is consistent with one’s worldview is retracted,
individuals are more likely to engage in motivated processing and discount the retraction even in
the face of concrete evidence and mounting facts (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017). Thus, it
seems that the continued influence effect grows stronger when it aligns with partisan goals and,
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by the same token, corrections are more effective if they affirm people’s worldview.
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that:
H4: Counter-attitudinal corrections will lead to a stronger continued influence effect,
compared with pro-attitudinal corrections 1.
To further tap into the notion of worldview, the current meta-analysis considers the topic
of the messages as a proxy-variable. Some studies on the continued influence of misinformation
use real-life controversies (e.g., vaccination) as a context. In such cases, study participants are
likely to have been exposed to the issue in the past and already developed a position.
Conversely, other studies construct scenarios that individuals will likely have no prior beliefs
about (e.g., fictitious news about a fire). Such “constructed” and “real-life” topics should vary in
the extent to which worldview plays a role in their processing (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). It is
hypothesized that:
H5: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger in real world contexts
versus constructed contexts.
Source evaluation. Over half a century of research reveals that with few exceptions,
credibility enhances persuasion outcomes (for review see Pornpitakpan, 2004). In particular,
when lacking sufficient motivation and expertise, source credibility serves as a useful heuristic,
guiding acceptance of the persuasive message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Similarly, in the
misinformation literature, studies have found that messages are more effective when they are
associated with a high-credibility source compared to a low-credibility source (Guillory &
Geraci, 2013). Though it is difficult to determine what lends credibility to a source of

1

No hypotheses concerning counter-attitudinal misinformation and interaction between misinformation and
correction were posed because of the inherent interdependency between the two. If the misinformation was attitudeconsistent, the correction is typically counter-attitudinal and vice versa.
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information (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), there is a general agreement that communicators’
credibility has a positive effect on both acceptance of misinformation and its correction (but see
Cho, Martens, Kim, & Rodrigue, 2011). Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H6a: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the
misinformation is attributed to a high-credibility source (compared to lowcredibility).
H6b: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the correction is
attributed to a low-credibility source (compared to high-credibility).
Another important dimension of the source involves equivalence between the source of
the misinformation and the source of the correction. Admitting a mistake is critical for building
trust (e.g., Rushton, Reina, & Reina, 2007); thus, a corrective message retracting one’s previous
statement should infuse confidence and acceptance of that message. Moreover, when a given
source corrects their own prior communication, the correction would be seen as more trustworthy
than a correction issued by a different party with possible ulterior motivations. Based on this
logic, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requires that corrective advertising will be made by
the same brand that was responsible for spreading the false information. For example, Doan’s
analgesic products (Mazis & Adkinson, 1976) and Warner-Lambert’s Listerine mouthwash
(Armstrong, Gurol, & Russ, 1979) were tasked to sponsor and deliver campaigns to counteract
their own past misleading advertising efforts. It is therefore hypothesized that:
H7: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the source of the
correction is different from (rather than equivalent to) the source of misinformation.
Negativity bias. Compared to positive information, negative information is more salient
and is more rapidly recognized. Moreover, negative information is assigned greater weight and it
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is, therefore, more consequential in decision making and impression formation (for review see
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998;
Rozin, & Royzman, 2001). Unsurprisingly, then, negativity bias plays a role in transmission of
information, as individuals are more likely to pass along information about negative events than
about positive events when recounting a story containing both elements (Bebbington, MacLeod,
Ellison, & Fay, 2017). It is conceivable that the appeal of some misconceptions circulated in the
media stems from its negative valance. The MMR vaccination-autism myth, conspiracy theories,
and rumors of a scandal can be more salient, memorable, and compelling than the nonsensational, valance-neutral truths that attempt to debunk these false claims. In other words,
negativity bias might, at least in part, be responsible for the persistent influence of
misinformation when individuals continue to retain and retrieve refuted information:
H8a: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the
misinformation is negative (vs. positive or neutral).
H8b: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the correction is
positive or neutral (vs. negative).
Retrieval failure due to negation. Lewandowsky et al. (2012) suggest that another
challenge for discounting misinformation is failure in the processes of encoding and retrieval of
memories. Specifically, according to the schema plus tag theory (Clark & Chase, 1972), people
encode negative memories by creating a positive memory with a negative tag. In other words,
when the original misinformation is linguistically negated (e.g., “Jim is not guilty”) the
information is encoded by adding a negative tag to an existing mental representation of the
misinformation (Jim guilty – not). This tag can then be “lost” or fail to be subsequently
retrieved. Thus, merely thinking of negation statements (“X is not Y”) creates false memories of
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the negated object (Fiedler et al. 1996). To avoid this, affirming language (e.g., “John is
innocent”) should be used in lieu of negating language (Mayo et al., 2014). In fact, the
deleterious influence of correcting by negating, prompted a succinct recommendation to “avoid
negations” (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012, p. 1). Following this line of reasoning, it is hypothesized
that:
H9: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger when the correction
message involves linguistic negation compared to affirmative language.
Method
Sampling
Literature search. Studies were located through a search in electronic databases (e.g.,
Google Scholar, JSTOR, PsychINFO, ProQuest, Communication and Mass Media Complete),
using the search terms: debunking, misinformation, correction, “continued influence”, and their
derivations. Then, the reference lists of these publications were examined to identify any
prospective studies that were not obtained through the database search. Finally, 12 experts from
the fields of communication, political science, cognitive and social psychology were contacted in
order to solicit unpublished data and identify omissions in our sample.
Inclusion criteria. The goal of the present study was to identify the extent to which
corrections can revert participants’ state back to baseline. Thus, to be included in the sample, a
study had to report on a comparison between a misinformation and correction condition and a
no-misinformation control group. Studies that focused on correction of misinformation without
including a no misinformation condition were excluded (e.g., Johnson & Seifert, 1994).
Moreover, the meta-analysis examined processing conflicting information, such that information
is first presented as true but is subsequently revoked or challenged. Hence, the sample does not
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include studies in which the misinformation is only presented in the context of negation of this
information (e.g., false information is accompanied with the label “myth”, Skurnik, et al., 2005).
Also excluded are studies in which misinformation is presented following a forewarning without
a post-misinformation correction (e.g., Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010). Finally, only
studies that reported quantitative outcomes using appropriate statistics for calculating an effect
size were included in the analyses. When such information was not directly available in the
research report, corresponding authors were contacted and the missing information was obtained
(Figure 1 illustrates a flow diagram showing the study screening process).
--- Figure 1 --Sample. The final sample included 32 individual studies from 21 research reports (3,
14.3% unpublished), with a total sample size of 6,527 (M = 203.97, Med = 107, SD = 221.05).
The most common topic of misinformation among the studies that met the inclusion criteria was
politics (k = 11), followed by health/science (k = 8), crime/accidents (k = 7), and other (k = 6).
Coding. The articles were coded by two coders with a 20% overlap to ensure continued
reliability. Krippendorff’s alpha for all variables was satisfactory (range: .71 – 1.0). The
relatively low reliability resulted from judgments made by coders examining the original
research stimuli, such as establishing the credibility of the information or whether the
information carries positive or negative valance.
Moderators
Coherence of misinformation and correction. The stimuli employed by the researchers
of the original studies have been obtained and coded for coherence. Coherence was coded as a
binary (high/low) variable based on the amount of detail and context provided in the message.
For corrective information to be coded as high in coherence, the message had to mention a
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reason for the distribution of the misinformation or provide an alternative explanation, rather
than merely retract the misinformation. Overall, nine effect sizes were associated with highcoherence of misinformation and 13 were coded as low-coherence of misinformation. Further,
14 effect sizes were recorded for high-coherence corrections and 17 effect sizes were recorded
for low-coherence corrections.
Time delay. Time delay between misinformation and correction. Each study was coded
as either presenting the correction immediately following the misinformation (k = 17) or after a
filler task (k = 10). In five studies, corrections were presented both immediately after the
misinformation and after a filler task.
Repetition of misinformation and correction. The number of separate instances in
which misinformation has been repeated prior to correction was coded as a continuous variable.
Though the vast majority of effect sizes were associated with a single exposure to
misinformation, there were some cases where misinformation was repeated twice (k = 6) and
even three times (k = 2). Similarly, the number of time the corrective message has been
presented was coded, resulting in 29 effect sizes for a single exposure and three cases in which
corrections were presented three times.
Repetition of misinformation in correction. Each corrective message was coded as
either reiterating the misinformation (k = 13) or only providing the correct information without
restating the false information (k = 11).
Consistency with worldview. This variable was coded only for studies that manipulated
consistency between the participants’ worldview and the valance of the correction. For example,
if a correction message about a Democrat candidate (e.g., she resigned not due to the previously
published allegations of corruption but rather to spend more time with her family) was presented
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to a sample of self-identified Democrats. In total, the sample of studies included six studies with
pro-attitudinal corrections and seven studies with counter-attitudinal corrections.
Context. The context of the misinformation was coded as either real-world situations
(e.g., pertaining to actual events such as the war in Iraq) (k = 14) or fictional events (e.g., a
fictitious news story about a rubbery) (k = 18).
Source credibility. The source of the misinformation was coded as either having high
credibility (k = 7) or low credibility (k = 21) based on the implied expertise and trustworthiness
of the source. Similarly, the source of the corrective message was coded as either having high (k
= 15) or low credibility (k = 15).
Source equivalence. For each study it was determined whether the same source
provided both the misinformation and correction (k = 22) or whether these two types of
information were attributed to two different sources (k = 12).
Negativity of misinformation and correction. The valance of the of the misinformation
and the correction was determined based on whether the situation is negative (or neutral/positive)
assuming the information is correct. Specifically, in 19 cases misinformation was coded as
negative and in 13 cases misinformation was coded as natural or positive. In addition, six studies
were associated with exposure to negatively valanced corrections and 25 studies exposed
participants to positively valanced or neutral corrections.
Linguistic negation. Based on inspection of the stimuli used in the original studies, each
correction message was coded for whether it used negation (repeating the misinformation with a
negation tag “no”) (k = 13) or used affirmative language (k = 9). Please see Table 1 for a
complete list of coded studies and moderators.
--- Table 1 ---
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Analysis
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (v.3; Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005)
was used to analyze the data, with weights being assigned to primary studies based on the
inverse of the variance, as opposed to alternative approaches that assign weights based on sample
size. The results focus on random-effects models, allowing to generalize the findings beyond
the specific populations from which the data was drawn (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). For ease of
interpretation, we used a correlation coefficient r as the effect size estimate. This coefficient
represents the effect of exposure to misinformation that is later corrected compared with a noexposure condition. A negative r indicates stronger continued influence effect, a null effect
indicates that the corrective message was able to erase the influence of misinformation, and a
positive r suggests that exposure to the corrective message not merely erased the influence of
misinformation but also affected participants’ beliefs in a direction consistent with the
correction.
After analyzing the average effect of continued influence, the analysis focused on the Q
statistic to assess the heterogeneity among effect sizes (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, &
Rothstein, 2005), defined as:
𝑘𝑘

𝑄𝑄 = � 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀)2
𝑖𝑖 = 1

Where Wi is the study weight (1/Vi), Yi, is the study effect size, M is the summary effect,
and k is the number of studies. Thus, the Q statistic computes the deviation of each subgroup
from the mean weighted by the inverse-variance to yield the weighted sum of squares (WSS), or
Q. Given significant heterogeneity, the potential role played by categorical moderators (i.e.,
coherence, worldview, context, credibility, equivalence, negativity, and linguistic negation) was
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further probed with Q statistic and the continues moderator (i.e., repetition) was tested with a
meta-regression (Rosenthal, 1991).
Results
Across 32 individual studies, the average continued influence effect on beliefs was weak,
negative, and significant (r = -.05, CI [-.10, -.01], p = .045). This suggests that, even after
exposure to corrections, some weak traces of misinformation continue to influence people’s
beliefs. Further, significant heterogeneity was observed among effect sizes Q (31) = 156.52, p =
.0005, I2 = 80.19), indicating variability that might be explained by moderators (Pearce & Field,
2015).
Contrary to H1a, there was no significant difference in effect sizes between high (r = .08, CI [-.18, .01], p = .09) and low-coherence (r = -.03, CI [-.11, .06], p = .54) misinformation;
(Q(1) = 0.79, p = .37). Though-coherence of the misinformation was a nonsignificant moderator,
coherence of the correction emerged as a significant predictor of effect sizes; Q(1) = 4.46, p =
.027, with high-coherence corrections resulting in weaker and nonsignificant continued influence
effects (r = -.03, CI [-.12, .06], p = .37), compared with corrections low in coherence (r = -.12,
CI [-.19, -.03], p = .004). Further, the interaction between the coherence of the misinformation
and the coherence of the correction was tested by creating four groups that included all possible
combinations of the coherence moderator (corresponding to high-coherence misinformation +
high-coherence correction, high-coherence misinformation + low-coherence correction, lowcoherence misinformation + high-coherence correction, and low-coherence misinformation +
low-coherence correction). As Figure 2 illustrates, there was a borderline significant difference
between the resulting subgroups (Q(3) = 2.97, p = .07), with the strongest impact of
misinformation occurring when high-coherence misinformation was corrected with low-
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coherence correction (r = -.19, CI [-.34, -.04], p = .04).
--- Figure 2 --A significant effect of time delay between exposure to misinformation and its correction
was found (Q(1) = 4.79, p = .045). The continued effect of misinformation was stronger when
the correction was presented after a filler task (r = -.13, CI [-.28, -.02], p = .045) compared to
misinformation that was corrected immediately (r =.01, CI [-.05, .06], p = .87). Further, a metaregression was used to test the role played by repetition of misinformation and its correction. In
particular, the analysis indicated that repetition of misinformation is a significant predictor of the
continued influence effect (b = -.30, SE = .12, p = .001), with each additional repetition of
misinformation enhancing its continued influence on beliefs by an average of .30 points. Though
the moderation pattern was in the expected direction, there was no significant difference (Q(1) =
.1.79, p = .18) between studies that repeated the misinformation within the correction (r = -.10,
CI [-.19, -.01], p = .03) and studies that used corrective messages without restating the
misinformation (r = -.02, CI [-.09, .05], p = .52). Regretfully, given the lack of variance in our
sample, we were not able to test the role played by repetition of corrective information.
As predicted, counter-attitudinal corrections led to stronger continued influence effects (r
= -.20, CI [-.32, -.07], p = .002), compared with pro-attitudinal corrections that tended to yield
nonsignificant effects (r = -.01, CI [-.15, .15], p = .72); Q(1) = 4.78, p = .018. Additionally, there
was no significant difference between real world contexts (r = -.02, CI [-.09, .05], p = .50) and
constructed, or fictional (r = -.04, CI [-.13, .04], p = .32), contexts; Q(1) = 0.12, p = .73. The
same results were obtained when discrete study topics were considered rather than comparing
real world and fictional contexts overall. No significant difference emerged in effects sizes by
the topic of misinformation in the study; Q(2) = 0.13, p = .93; politics (r = -.04, CI [-.09, .01], p
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= .15), health/science (r = -.02, CI [-.13, .08], p = .68), and crime/accidents (r = -.07, CI [-.30,
.18], p = .61).
With respect to source credibility, the continued influence effect was stronger (Q(1) =
4.54, p = .033) when misinformation was attributed to a high credibility source (r = -.18, CI [.33, -.02], p = .03) compared to a low credibility source (r = .01, CI [-.05, .06], p = .76). Yet, the
credibility of the source delivering the correction was less important, as there was no significant
difference (Q(1) = 3.12, p = .077) between high credibility sources (r = -.09, CI [-.16, -.02], p =
.02) and low credibility sources (r = .02, CI [-.08, .11], p = .70). Additionally, there was a
significant difference between effect sizes of studies where the source of the misinformation was
the same as the source of the correction, as opposed to cases where the source of misinformation
was different from the source of correction (Q(1) = 3.74, p = .05). As hypothesized, the
continued influence effect was weaker when the same source delivered both the correction and
the misinformation (r = .01, CI [-.06, .08], p = .74) and stronger effects were observed when
different sources were responsible for misinformation and its correction (r = -.10, CI [-.18, -.01],
p = .02).
Further, there was no significant difference in the continued influence effect (Q(1) = 0.04,
p = .85) between negatively valanced misinformation (r = -.04, CI [-.11 .03], p = .25) and neutral
or positive misinformation (r = -.06, CI [-.15, .04], p = .26). Similarly, there was no significant
difference between the impact of misinformation (Q(1) = 0.99, p = .32) when participants were
exposed to negatively valanced (r = .01, CI [-.12 .14], p = .87) corrections and neutral or positive
corrections (r = -.06, CI [-.12, -.001], p = .05). Finally, in contrast with our expectation, the
continued influence of misinformation did not differ (Q(1) = 0.90, p = .34) by whether the
correction message involved linguistic negation (r = -.08, CI [-.12 .01], p = .04) or affirmative
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language (r = -.08, CI [-.16, .05], p = .47).
Publication bias
In order to examine a possible “file drawer” problem, a fail-safe N was calculated
(Rosenthal, 1991). According to the results, it would require 73 missing studies with an effect
size of 0 to render the average effect size of continuous influence nonsignificant. To this end,
though the results are not directly compromised by unpublished research, it can also be argued
that the continued influence effect is far from being pervasive and robust.
Discussion
The current meta-analysis synthesizes four decades of research on continued influence of
misinformation. Overall, correction of misinformation does not entirely revert people’s attitudes
and beliefs to their baseline levels. Rather, misinformation continues to have a small, albeit
significant, effect. The meta-analysis considered six complementary theoretical explanations of
this effect, examining features of the misinformation and its correction. A summary of these
findings appears in Table 2. Data suggest that repetition of the misinformation, coherence of
misinformation coupled with a low-coherence correction, and credibility of the misinformation
result in the greatest continued misinformation effect. Conversely, this effect is diminished
when correction is delivered immediately, when it is consistent with the message recipient’s
worldview, and it is attributed to the same source that was responsible for the misinformation.
Together, these results provide at least partial support to explanations relying on theories of
mental models, fluency, world-view consistent elaboration and source evaluation. No support
was found for the negativity bias and retrieval failure according to the schema plus tag theory.
--- Table 2 --Considering the pattern of results (see Table 2), mental models appears to be the most
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consistently supported explanation. Curiously, it also seems that the encoding of misinformation
rather than the correction plays a more major role: the repetition of misinformation creates
fluency (but not debunking efforts), and the credibility of the source of the misinformation (but
not the correction) matters. While reading the misinformation, individuals construct an event
model, namely a mental representation of a specific situation. During the reading process, as the
narrative evolves, individuals continuously update the model (Zawaan, Langston, Graesser,
1995). Thus, when the correction appears alongside the misinformation (e.g., a balanced news
story containing both sides of the argument – the misinformation and the rebuttal) readers are
able to encode the corrective information and incorporate it in the mental model displacing the
misinformation. However, when the information is not corrected immediately, the episodic
model generated while reading the misinformation is already integrated into the schematic
representation of the issue. As noted in past research, “the initial integration of information
when the model is being built is more readily performed than is its updating after a retraction”
(Ozturk, Li, & Sakamoto, 2015, p. 2407).
The significant findings concerning world view-consistency can also be interpreted in
light of theories of mental representation. Political ideology constitutes a cognitive schema
whose epistemological function includes explaining phenomena and making predictions (Jost,
Federico, & Napier, 2009). In general, schemas guide attention to information, help organize
and store it, fill-in gaps, and assist in problem solving (Busselle, 2017). Like other types of
schema, political ideology guides individuals’ attention to information. Thus, with counterattitudinal misinformation, the message recipient is motivated to attend to a worldviewconsistent correction that will reduce the cognitive dissonance caused by the misinformation.
Once the individual attends to the world-view consistent corrective information, ideology can be
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used as a schema to fill-in the missing information. For example, consider a situation in which
the correction is low in coherence but is worldview-consistent. In other words, it negates the
misinformation without providing an alternative explanation, but it is consistent with the
message recipient’s beliefs. The message recipient then will be motivated to generate a
worldview-driven explanation. It is, therefore, plausible that worldview-consistency increases
tolerance for low-coherence correction, since the gaps in the mental model can be supplemented
by the overarching schema.
Whereas multiple findings in the meta-analysis are consistent with predictions derived
from theories of mental models, no support was found for negativity bias and linguistic negation.
Negation language and the valance of the misinformation/ correction did not seem to moderate
the persistence of misinformation. However, no studies in the sample specifically manipulated
these effects. Future research will be well served to examine negativity bias and negation more
systematically by manipulating these variables within the study design.
Limitations
Though meta-analyses offer a bird’s view of the literature that cannot be attained by
individual studies, they are also limited to the pool of available studies. Consequently, some
potential moderators and relevant outcomes were not analyzed due to insufficient number of
cases. For example, there is a need for additional research on repetitions of correction messages
as only few studies manipulated this variable in a systematic way. Moreover, the meta-analysis
exclusively focused on beliefs as an outcome because of the limited number of studies reporting
other types of outcomes. It is not implausible that the continued influence of misinformation
has different effects on recall, knowledge, or behavior, as it has on beliefs. Arguably, these
outcomes represent different stages within the process of persuasion (or debiasing) (McGuire,
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1968) and they can be affected in different ways.
Finally, the current meta-analysis was limited to randomized experiments which
inherently suggests a tradeoff between internal and external validity. Although the current
study’s approach offers a stronger theoretical understanding of how misinformation effects can
persist, it is important to be cautious when generalizing these findings to real-world settings.
Specifically, randomized experiments ensure equivalence between study participants who are
exposed to the misinformation and correction and those who were exposed to neither. However,
outside the artificially controlled experimental environment, individuals who are exposed to
misinformation are likely to differ on various background characteristics from those who were
not exposed to the misinformation at all (e.g., due to processes of selective exposure individuals
are inclined to seek out attitude-confirming information). Hence, while the current study
asserted that correction of misinformation has the potential to bring one’s attitude to the same
level as that of individuals who were never exposed to the misinformation in the first place, the
effects uncovered in this meta-analysis represent a best-case scenario.
Practical Implications
The results of the meta-analysis can be used to prescribe specific recommendations for
more effective misinformation correction efforts.
Credibility attack. Corrections should criticize the credibility of the source of the
misinformation. This serves two functions. First, source credibility is central to processing of
the initial (mis)information but not for the correction source. Thus, trying to undo the damage
done by climate change deniers and vaccine skeptics with messages that rely, primarily, on the
expertise of their sources is likely to be futile. Instead, the correction should focus on
discrediting the sources of misinformation. For example, rather than emphasizing the knowledge
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of a climate science expert, messages should highlight the lack of expertise and relevant training
of climate change skeptics. Second, questioning the credibility of the misinformation source can
enhance the coherence of the corrective message. Put differently, discrediting the source as
biased and lacking good will can offer an explanation for the spread of the misinformation and
make it easier for message consumers to maintain a coherent mental model that dismisses the
misinformation.
Same-source correction. Corrections coming from the same source as the
misinformation carry more weight than messages delivered by different sources. This finding
endorses the FTC mandate for corrective information to be attributed to the same source as the
original misinformation. By extension, corrective campaigns can choose spokespersons who are
members from the same social group as the source of misinformation. For instance, to
effectively discredit an anti-vaccination campaign led by parents of children with autism, it may
be helpful to feature parents of children with autism who support vaccines.
World-view consistency. Corrections work better when they fit into people’s worldview and when misinformation runs counter to preexisting beliefs. Thus, designers of corrective
messages should strive to emphasize how the accurate information fits with people’s broader
belief system. This approach can be extremely challenging, especially when dealing with valueladen beliefs (e.g., political ideology); however, in some cases, it is likely to work. For instance,
consumers often fear genetically modified organisms (GMOs) because, supposedly, “big food”
companies are trying to take advantage of unsuspecting individuals. Specifically, fear of GMOs
is rooted in false notions that moving genes between species is unnatural and risky; yet, these
erroneous beliefs might sound very convincing because they align with people’s general fears
about health and science (Pew Research Center, 2016). A more promising dialogue with GMOs
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skeptics would emphasize its positive impact on farmers and the economy, rather than focusing,
almost exclusively, on the technology and science behind it (Ben-Shahar, 2017).
Contextualization and explanation. Finally, corrective messages need to provide not
only a negation of the misinformation but also explanations that have both internal (i.e.,
compelling and consistent account) and external (i.e., fits the general understanding of how the
world operates) coherence. This is especially critical when the initial misinformation provides a
complete and clear account. For example, instead of emphasizing agreement among scientists, a
much more compelling story about the root of climate science denial can recount how oil
companies sponsor political lobbyists to protect their profits and limit future liabilities. This is a
simple story that fits within laypeople’s preexisting understanding of the problematic
relationship between politicians and interest groups.
In sum, the results of the study paint an optimistic outlook on the effectiveness of
correction. Although there is an undeniable effect of misinformation in the face of correction, it
is far from being the robust and irreversible phenomenon it is often believed to be. Therefore,
researchers and practitioners can utilize various message design characteristics to avert or, at
least, minimize the threat of misinformation. It is our hope that this meta-analysis will contribute
to the existing body of knowledge and prove useful in correcting misinformation.
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Table 1. Studies included in Meta-Analysis
Study
Year Study
N
Topic
cg
Aikin et al.
2015
1
504 Misleading direct-to-consumer drug ads
Armstrong et al.bcegh
1979
1
102 Deceptive ads for Listerine mouthwash
bdefh
Berinsky
2015
1
556 Rumors about healthcare reform
Cobb, Nyhan, & Reiflerc 2013
1
168 Misleading information about a politician
bfh
Dixon et al.
2015
1
371 False information about the autism-vaccine link
Ecker et al.abdhij
2014
1
96 Fictitious report about a liquor store robbery
Ecker et al.abefh
2011
1
115 Fictitious news report about a warehouse fire
Greitemeyer et al.cf
2015
1
124 Scientific retraction
Greitemeyer et al.cf
2015
2
180 Scientific retraction
g
Greitemeyer
2014
1
106 Scientific retraction
Huangdefh
2017
1
252 Various rumors
befh
Huang
2017
2
248 Various rumors
Mazis & Adkinsonbcg
1976
1
54 Deceptive ads for a mouthwash brand
abce
Misra
1992
1
108 Deceptive information regarding ability
Misraabcef
1992
2
51 Rumors about McDonald’s use of worm meat
Misraabce
1992
3
48 Misleading information regarding supermarkets
bdefh
Nyhan & Reifler
2015
1
750 Rumors about political misconduct
Rapp & Kendeouce
2007
1
48 Refuted story
abcdf
Rich & Zaragoza
2016
1
111 Deceptive information regarding a jewelry theft
Rich & Zaragozaabcdef
2016
2
99 Deceptive information regarding a jewelry theft
gl
Sawyer & Semenik
1978
1
142 Deceptive ads for Listerine mouthwash
Thorsoncfhlij
2013
3a
87 Misleading information about misconduct
cfhlij
Thorson
2013
3b
92 Misleading information about health care policy
Thorsoncfhlij
2013
3c
81 Misleading information about misconduct
Thorsoncdefj
2016
1
96 Misleading information about misconduct
bcdfhij
Thorson
2016
2
316 Misleading information about misconduct
Thorsoncfhij
2016
3
307 Misleading information about misconduct
bdegl
Wood
2014
3
1012 Misinformation regarding climate science
Wyer & Budesheimcf
1987
1
69 Misleading information about a person
c
Wyer & Budesheim
1987
2
69 Misleading information about a person
Wyer & Budesheimc
1987
3
69 Misleading information about a person
cef
Wyer & Unverzagt
1985
1
96 Misleading information about a person
Note. acredible misinformation; bcredible correction; csame source; dhigh-coherence
misinformation; ehigh-coherence correction; fnegative misinformation; gnegative correction; huse
negation; ipro-attitudinal correction; jcounter-attitudinal correction; lunpublished.
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Table 2. Summary of Hypotheses, Variables and Findings
Theory and H#
H1-2: Mental models

Variable
Coherence

Misinformation
n.s.

Time delay

H3: Fluency

Repetition

Correction
supported
supported

supported

n.s.

Repetition of misinformation
in correction

H4-H5: Worldview consistent
elaboration

Consistency with preexisting
attitudes
Topic constructed/real

H6-H7: Source evaluation

Credibility

n.s.

*

n.s.
supported

Equivalence
H8: Negativity bias

Negativity

H9: Retrieval failure

Linguistic negation

supported

n.s.
supported

n.s.

Note. * Impossible to compute due to multicollinearity or unavailability of studies.

n.s.
n.s.

Interaction
supported
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Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram showing the study screening process
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Figure 2. The continued influence effect by coherence of misinformation (high/low) and
coherence of correction (high/low)
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